小企业贷款信用状况的关系，银行组织结构的重要性【外文翻译】 10页

外文翻译原文SmallBusinessCreditAvailabilityandRelationshipLending:TheImportanceofBankOrganisationalStructureMaterialSource:EconomicJournal,2002Author:AllenN.BergerAbstractThispapermodelstheinnerworkingsofrelationshiplending,theimplicationsforbankorganisationalstructure,andtheeffectsofshockstotheeconomicenvironmentontheavailabilityofrelationshipcredittosmallbusinesses.Relationshiplendingdependsontheaccumulationovertimebytheloanofficerof“soft”information.Becausetheloanofficeristherepositoryofthissoftinformation,agencyproblemsarecreatedthroughouttheorganisationthatmaybestberesolvedbystructuringthebankasasmall,closely-heldorganisationwithfewmanageriallayers.Theshocksanalysedincludetechnologicalinnovations,regulatoryregimeshifts,bankingindustryconsolidation,andmonetarypolicyshocks.Keywords:Banks,SmallBusiness,Mergers,Relationshiplending,OrganisationalStructureTheissueofcreditavailabilitytosmallfirmshasgarneredworld-wideconcernrecently.Modelsofequilibriumcreditrationingthatpointtomoralhazardandadverseselectionproblems(e.g.,StiglitzandWeiss,1981)suggestthatsmallfirmsmaybeparticularlyvulnerablebecausetheyareoftensoinformationallyopaque.Thatis,theinformationalwedgebetweeninsidersandoutsiderstendstobemoreacuteforsmallcompanies,whichmakestheprovisionofexternalfinanceparticularlychallenging.Smallfirmswithopportunitiestoinvestinpositivenetpresentvalueprojectsmaybeblockedfromdoingsobecausepotentialprovidersofexternalfinancecannotreadilyverifythatthefirmhasaccesstoaqualityproject(adverseselectionproblem)orensurethatthefundswillnotbedivertedtofundanalternativeproject(moralhazardproblem).Smallfirmsarealsovulnerablebecauseoftheirdependencyonfinancial institutionsforexternalfunding.Thesefirmssimplydonothaveaccesstopubliccapitalmarkets.Asaresult,shockstothebankingsystemcanhaveasignificantimpactonthesupplyofcredittosmallbusinesses.Thus,smallfirmsaresubjecttofundingproblemsinequilibriumandtheseproblemsmaybeexacerbatedduringperiodsofdisequilibriuminfinancialmarkets.Oneofthemostpowerfultechnologiesavailabletoreduceinformationproblemsinsmallfirmfinance,andamainsubjectofthispaper,is“relationshiplending.”Underrelationshiplending,banksacquireinformationovertimethroughcontactwiththefirm,itsowner,anditslocalcommunityonavarietyofdimensionsandusethisinformationintheirdecisionsabouttheavailabilityandtermsofcredittothefirm.Recentempiricalevidenceprovidessupportfortheimportanceofabankrelationshiptosmallbusinessesintermsofbothcreditavailabilityandcredittermssuchasloaninterestratesandcollateralrequirements(e.g.,PetersenandRajan,1994,1995;BergerandUdell,1995;Cole,1998;ElsasandKrahnen,1998;HarhoffandKörting1998a).Thepaperisorganisedasfollows.Section1offersabriefoverviewofsmallfirmfinancingandhighlightstheimportantrolethatfinancialinstitutionsplayinprovidingexternalfinancetosmallbusiness.Section2categoriseslendingintofourseparatetechnologies,ofwhichrelationshiplendingisone.Relationshiplendingiscomparedwiththeothertechnologiesintermsofhowthesetechnologiesareimplementedandtowhomtheyaretargeted.Section3examinestheorganisationalissuesassociatedwithstructuringthelendingfunctionbypresentingasimplemodelofbanklending.Theanalysissuggeststhatunderrelationshiplending,theaccumulationovertimeof“soft”informationbytheloanofficercreatesagencyproblemsthroughoutthebankingorganisationthatmaybestberesolvedbystructuringthebankasasmall,closely-heldorganisationwithfewmanageriallayers.Section4usesthemodeltoexaminetheimpactofshockstotheeconomicenvironmentinwhichbanksandsmallbusinessesoperateontheavailabilityofcredittosmallbusiness,includingtechnologicalinnovations(e.g.,creditscoring),regulatoryregimeshifts(e.g.,toughenedbanksupervision),shiftsincompetitiveconditions(e.g.,bankingindustryconsolidation),andchangesinthemacroeconomicenvironment(e.g.,monetarypolicyshocks).Section5concludes.1.SmallbusinessfinancingisintroducedTable1providesabreakdownofthesourcesofsmallfirmfinanceintheUnitedStatesbasedondatafromthe1993NationalSurveyofSmallBusiness Finance(adaptedfromBergerandUdell,1998,Althoughthedataaredrawnfromasinglenation,webelievethatthemainpointsillustratedbelow–e.g.,smallfirmsrelyonbothdebtandequity,smallfirmsusesubstantialamountsofinsiderfinance,banksarethechiefsourceofdebtfromfinancialinstitutionstosmallfirms,etc.–holdthroughoutmostoftheindustrialisedworld.Turningtosourcesofdebtforsmallbusiness,commercialbanksprovide18.75%oftotalfinance,financecompaniessupply4.91%,otherfinancialinstitutionsyield3.00%.Tradecreditprovides15.78%andtheprincipalownersupplies4.10%.Theremainingcategories(notshownindividually)includeotherbusiness1.74%,otherindividuals1.47%,government0.49%,andcreditcards0.14%.PanelsBandCofTable1showthefinancingdistributionbysizeofsmallbusinessandbyage,respectively.2.SmallBusinessLendingTechnologiesSmallbusinesslendingbyfinancialintermediariescanbecategorisedintoatleastfourmaindistinctlendingtechnologies–financialstatementlending,asset-basedlending,creditscoring,andrelationshiplending.Thesetechnologiesaredeployedtoaddressthetypesofproblemsthatcanleadtoeithercreditrationing(StiglitzandWeiss,1981)or“overlending”(deMezaandWebb,1987;deMeza,2002).Thefirstthreelendingtechnologiesareoftenreferredtoastransactions-basedlending,underwhichthelendingdecisionsarebasedon“hard”informationthatisrelativelyeasilyavailableatthetimeofloanoriginationanddoesnotrelyonthe“soft”datagatheredoverthecourseofarelationshipwiththeborrower.Smallbusinesscreditscoringisanadaptationtobusinesslendingofdiscriminantanalysisandotherstatisticaltechniqueslongusedinconsumerlending.Inadditiontousinginformationfromthefinancialstatementsofthebusiness,heavyweightingisalsoputonthefinancialconditionandhistoryoftheprincipalowner,giventhatthecreditworthinessofthefirmandtheownerarecloselyrelatedformostsmallbusinesses(Feldman,1997;Mester,1997).IntheUnitedStates,theuseofsmallbusinesscreditscoringisgenerallylimitedtosmallmicro-businessloansofupto$250,000.Smallbusinesscreditscoringisstillarelativelynewphenomenon.ItwasnotwidelyusedpriortotheintroductionofFair,Isaac’smodelin1995,andasofJanuary1998,37%ofasampleofthelargestbanksintheUnitedStatesstillhadnotadoptedsmall-businesscreditscoring(Frame,W.etal.,2001).3.TheBank-BorrowerRelationshipandtheProcessofBankLendingThediscussionthusfarsuggeststhatrelationshiplendingand transactions-basedlendingdifferinimportantways.Relationshiplendingisgenerallyassociatedwiththecollectionof“soft”informationovertimethroughrelationshipswiththefirm,theowner,andthelocalcommunity.Thissoftinformationmaynotbeeasilyobservedbyothers,verifiedbyothers,ortransmittedtoothers.Incontrast,transactions-basedlendingisgenerallyassociatedwiththeuseof“hard”informationproducedatthetimeofloanorigination.Thishardinformationisbasedonrelativelyobjectivecriteria,suchasfinancialratiosinthecaseoffinancialstatementlending,collateralratiosinthecaseofasset-basedlending,orFair,Isaac(FICO)creditscoresinthecaseofcreditscoring.Inthissection,wearguethatthesedifferenttypesoflendingrequiredifferentorganisationalstructuresforthebank.Relationshiplendingrequiresthatmoreauthoritybegiventotheloanofficer,whohasthegreatestaccesstothesoftrelationshipinformation.Thisgreaterauthority,inturn,createsagencyproblemswithinthebankthatnecessitatevariousorganisationalchecksandbalances.Astrongargumentcanbemadethatthemostimportantrelationshipsinrelationshiplendinginvolvetheloanofficer.Theloanofficeristhepersoninthebankwiththegreatestaccesstothesoftinformationaboutthefirm,owner,andcommunitythatarehardtoquantifyandcommunicatethroughtheorganisationalstructure.Theloanofficergenerallyhasthemostpersonalcontactwiththesmallbusiness,itsowner,andemployees.Theloanofficeralsotypicallylivesinthelocalcommunityandhascontactswithotherlocalfirmsandindividualsthathaverelevantinformationaboutthefirmanditsownerandaboutthebusinessconditionsinlocalmarket.Throughthesecontacts,theloanofficerisabletoobservethefirm’sandtheowner’sfinancialconditionsandtheirperformanceonexplicitandimplicitcontractswiththebankandwithothers.Thisissuehasnotbeenexploredinanypenetratingwayinthefinanceliterature,althoughUzziandGillespie(1999)usedasociologicalparadigmtoframethisrelationshipintermsofa“socialattachment.”Theloanofficeralsotypicallyhasthemostintimateknowledgeoftheharddataintheloanfileandmaybeinthebestpositiontointegratethetwotypesofinformation.4.ShockstotheEconomicEnvironmentandtheAvailabilityofRelationshipCreditShockstotheeconomicenvironmentinwhichbanksandsmallbusinessesoperatecansignificantlyaffectthecontractinghierarchyandthepropensityofbankstomakerelationshiploans.Theseshockscancomeinavarietyofformssuchastechnologicalinnovations,regulatoryregimeshifts,shiftsincompetitiveconditions, andchangesinthemacroeconomicenvironment.Weofferexamplesofeachofthesetypesofshocksandexaminetherelevantresearchevidence.Asanexampleoftechnologicalinnovation,securitizationofsmallbusinessloansmaybeoneofhemostintriguing.Itinvolvestheadoptionoftheinnovativefinancialtechnologyalreadyusedinthemortgagemarketandelsewheretothemarketforsmallbusinessloans.However,effortstosecuritizesmallbusinessloanshavebeenquiteproblematic(Acs,1999).Governmentsubsidisationofasecondarymarketforsmallbusinessloanscouldhaveasignificantimpactbyreducingfundingcoststosmallbusinesseswhoseloansaresecuritizedandincreasingthetotalnumberofsmallbusinessloansgranted.However,insomecases,suchapolicywouldencouragethesecuritizationofrelationshiploanswitharesultinglossofrelationshipbenefits.Thus,inconsideringsuchapolicy,thesocialbenefitswouldhavetobeweighedagainstthepossibilitythatmanyrelationshiploansarelikelynottobesecuritized,andtheonesthataresecuritizedmaylosemanyofthebenefitsassociatedwithrelationshiplending.Theremayalsohavebeenaregulatoryregimeshiftin1993intheUnitedStatesdesignedtoincreasesmallbusinesslending,particularlyrelationshiplending.Themainfederalsupervisorsofbanksandthriftsbeganajointprogramofactionsdesignedtoalleviatetheapparentreluctanceoffinancialinstitutionstolend(InteragencyPolicyStatementonCreditAvailability,March10,1993).Forexample,undersomecircumstances,bankswereallowedtomakeloanswithminimaldocumentationtosmallbusinesscustomerswithwhomtheyhadpastexperience–andnotbecriticisedbyexaminersfordoingso.Onestudyofthispotentialregimeshiftfoundevidenceconsistentwithbothaslightreductioninsupervisorytoughnessduring1993-1998andasmallincreaseinsmallbusinesslendingassociatedwiththereducedtoughness(Berger,A.etal.,2001c).Anumberofshiftsincompetitiveconditionsinbankinghavecombinedtoresultinsignificantconsolidationofthebankingindustryaroundtheglobe.Whiletechnologicalchangeandotherfactorshaveplayedrolesinthisconsolidation,arguablythemostimportantshiftshavecomefromgovernmentderegulation.Studiesoftheeffectsofbankconsolidationonsmallbusinesslendingusuallyfoundthatmergersandacquisitionsinvolvinglargebankingorganisationsreducedsmallbusinesslendingsubstantially,althoughconsolidationsbetweensmallorganisationsoftenincreasedsmallbusinesslending(e.g.,Keeton,1996,PeekandRosengren,1998;StrahanandWeston,1998;Berger,A.etal.,1998;Averyand Samolyk,2000;BonaccorsidiPattiandGobbi,2000).Otherstudies,however,suggestthatconsolidationandbanksizearenotveryeconomicallysignificant.Onestudyfoundnoclearevidencethatsmallbusinessloanapplicationshaveahigherprobabilityofbeingdeniedbyconsolidatingbanksandotherbanksintheirlocalmarkets(ColeandWalraven,1998).Anotherfoundthattheprobabilityofasmallfirmobtainingalineofcreditorpayinglateonitstradecreditdoesnotdependinameaningfulwayonthepresenceofsmallbanksinthemarket(JayaratneandWolken,1999).Otherresearchfoundthatsmallbusinessesobtainlinesofcreditfromsmallbanksroughlyinproportiontothepresenceofsmallbanksinthelocalmarket,ratherthandisproportionatelymorefromsmallbanksasmightbeexpectedbasedontheextantliterature(Berger,A.etal.,2001d).Itwasalsofoundthattheinterestrateschargedonsmallbusinesslinesofcredittendtobelowerinmarketsdominatedbylargebanksthaninmarketsdominatedbysmallbanks(Berger,A.etal.,2001d).Stillotherresearchfoundmixedeffectsonhowsmallbusinessesperceivetheirtreatmentbyconsolidatingbanks(ScottandDunkelberg,1999).5.ConclusionChangesintheeconomicenvironmentinwhichbanksandsmallbusinessesoperate–suchasdomesticandcross-borderconsolidationofthebankingindustry–haveheightenedconcernabouttheavailabilityofcredittosmallbusinesses.Partofthisconcernreflectsthefactthatsmallbusinessesareofteninformationallyopaqueandhavefarfeweralternativestoexternalfinancethanlargecompanies.Notsurprisingly,theempiricalevidencesuggeststhatmanysmallbusinessesarehighlydependentonbanksforexternalfinance.Oneofthemostimportanttechnologiesemployedbybanksinextendingcredittoinformationallyopaquesmallbusinessesisrelationshiplending.Althoughrelationshiplendinghasbeenthesubjectofconsiderablerecentresearchinterest,theprocessofrelationshiplendingisnotwellunderstood.Aclearunderstandingofhowtherelationshiplendingtechnologyworksandhowtheorganisationalstructureofthebankaffectsitsabilitytodeliverthisserviceareneededtoassesshowrecentchangesintheeconomicenvironmentarelikelytoaffecttheavailabilityofcredittosmallbusinesses.Thispapermodelstheinnerworkingsofrelationshiplending,theimplicationsforbankorganisationalstructure,andtheeffectsofshockstotheeconomicenvironmentontheavailabilityofrelationshipcredittosmallbusinesses.Shockstotheeconomicenvironmentinwhichbanksandsmallbusinessesoperatecansignificantlyaffectthecontractinghierarchyandthepropensityofbanks tomakerelationshiploans.Withinthecontextofourmodel,weanalysetheeffectsofanumberoftheseshocksontheavailabilityofrelationshipcredittosmallbusinessesandreviewtherelevantresearchevidence.Thefindingsmayshedlightonanumberofrelevantpolicyissues,including,butnotlimitedto,1)whetherasecondarymarketforsmallbusinessloansshouldbecreatedorsubsidised,2)theeffectsofregulatoryregimeshifts--suchasachangeinbankcapitalrequirementsoratougheningofsupervisorystandards--onthesupplyofrelationshipcredit,and3)theeffectsofmacroeconomicchanges,suchasshiftsinmonetarypolicy,onrelationshiplendingtosmallbusiness.译文小企业贷款信用状况的关系，银行组织结构的重要性资料来源：经济日报，2002作者：艾伦全伯杰摘要本文分析了关系型贷款的内部运作、银行组织结构的影响和小企业对经济环境的冲击作用。借贷关系取决于信贷员在一段时间内对小企业信息认识的积累，因为信贷员是这个软信息的知识库，代理问题在整个创建的组织里，可能是解决银行结构化的最好的紧密组织。这种冲击分析包括技术创新，监管制度的变化，银行业的巩固和货币政策的冲击。关键词：银行，小型企业，兼并，关系型贷款，组织结构目前，小企业信用问题的可用性已经获得世界的广泛关注。均衡信贷配给指向道德风险和逆向选择问题（例如，StiglitzandWeiss,1981)）表明，小企业可能特别脆弱，因为小企业往往在信息上不透明。也就是说，小企业与外界之间的内部信息楔形往往更敏锐。这使得提供外部财务更加具有挑战性。小公司的积极净现值价值项目的投资机会可能受阻，因为外部融资潜力提供商不能轻易确认该公司已经获得了优质工程（逆向选择问题），或保证资金不会被转移到一个备选基金项目（道德风险问题）。小企业特别脆弱，因为他们依赖金融机构的外部资金。而这些外部资金根本没有进入公共资本市场。结果，冲击银行系统对银行为小企业信贷供应具有重大影响。因此，小企业的资金平衡问题可能会加剧。有一种强大的技术可降低小企业信息的问题，而本文的主要议题，是”关系型贷款”。根据关系型贷款，银行通过获得信息与该公司在时间上的联系， 以及当地社区的各种规模来决定中小企业关于此信息的可用性和信用条件。最近的一些经验证据能够支持银行与小企业在信用可用性和信用条件方面的重要关系，例如贷款利率和抵押品需求(eg,PetersenandRajan,1994,1995;BergerandUdell,1995;Cole,1998;ElsasandKrahnen1998;HarhoffandKörting1998a).本文安排如下：第一部分提供了一个简要的介绍小企业融资和强调了金融组织对小企业提供外部资金的重要性。第二部分把放贷进行四个不同的技术归类，其中一个是关系型贷款。根据这些科技产品关系型贷款比其它技术易于实现他们的目标。第三部分调查组织相关的问题，通过构建一个简单的银行贷款模型来说明贷款功能。分析表明，在关系型贷款中，随时间积累的”软”信息由贷款职员通过银行组织创造代理问题法是对于管理层少的而具有严密组织性的小银行解决构建的最好办法。第四部分采用模型检查银行对小企业在小型商业信用操作中具有可用性的经济环境影响，包括技术创新(例如,信用评分法),监管制度变化(e.g.,toughenedbanksupervision),不断变化的竞争条件(e.g.,bankingindustryconsolidation),宏观经济环境的变化(e.g.,monetarypolicyshocks)。第五部分得出结论。1小企业融资介绍表1提供了1993年美国全国性调查中小企业融资数据(adaptedfromBergerandUdell,1998,Table1)。确切地说,它显示了账面价值的私有股份的百分比和私人债务加权，描绘了以美国企业作为一个整体的所有非农，非财务，非真实土地，用小工商管理公司将小企业归类为少于500个全日制员工的企业。虽然目前的资料都是来自一个国家，我们看下面要点的解释，例如，小公司依赖双债务和股权,并使用大量的内部财务,小企业金融机构是银行债务的主要来源。表1显示面板的一个小型企业,依赖于两个方面:股权(49.63%)和债务(50.37%)。资金来源被分解为四类股票和九类债务。小组A显示了所有企业的分布。最大的股票类别是主要所有者提供的资金——总股本加上债务或大约有三分之二的总资产的31.33%。主要的所有者通常拥有最大股份所有权和最先财务决策权。初始团队的其他成员，家人，朋友都包含在我们的下一个最大的权益类、其他权益,在12.86%。转向小企业债务的来源，商业银行提供总财务的18.75%，金融公司提供4.91%,其他金融机构提供3.00%.,贸易信贷提供15.78%,主要所有者提供4.10%。剩下的类别(没有单独显示)包括其它商业1.74%,其他个体1.47%、政府0.49%,信用卡0.14%，面板B和C表1显示的融资分配大小按年龄分别使用。2小企业借贷技术金融中介机构对小企业借贷主要分成贷款技术-财务报表贷款,以资产为基础的贷款、信用评分以及两性关系贷款。 前三个贷款技术通常被称为贷款交易,借贷决策在基于”硬”的相关信息的时候容易获得贷款的产生而不依赖于”软”的相关信息。小企业信用评分法是一种适应商业贷款的消费借贷。在美国,使用小型商业信用评估一般限于小、微型企业贷款，贷款额达到25万美元。小企业信用评分法还是一个比较新的现象。它并没有广泛被用来引进，1998年1月，美国最大的银行中有37%仍未采用小型企业信用评分(Frame,W.etal.,2001)。3银行与借款人的关系和银行贷款过程讨论至今的贷款和交易表明关系贷款有不同的重要途径，如一般关系型贷款相关的”软”信息与该公司通过公司关系，所有者，和当地社区获得的信息。这种软资讯可能不够容易被人观察到，被人验证到，或者传播向他人。相反,交易相关贷款通常是使用”硬”信息的时候产生贷款首创。这种硬信息是基于相对客观标准的,例如担保贷款的情况下,以资产为基础的贷款,或公允、以撒(FICO)信用分数信用评分的情况。在这一节中,我们认为这些不同类型的贷款需要不同的银行组织结构。关系型贷款需要更多的权利给贷款提供者，有最大的访问软信息的系统。反过来,创造代理问题必须在银行的各种组织检查和平衡内。在关系型贷款中，贷款职员是对方的银行拥有的最大的软信息，这家公司的所有者很难通过组织结构进行量化计算和沟通。信贷员一般都有最个人化的，能与小企业，或它的所有者和雇员联系的方法。信贷员在当地社区也有典型的生活，和别的地区的公司、个人有接触并得到该公司和它的所有者和当地市场业务环境相关的信息。在这些接触时,贷款职员应该遵守公司的和所有者的财务状况和其在履行银行与他人的显性激励和隐性的合约。贷款职员在贷款文件的确凿数据上具有最亲密的贷款知识，并可能是在最好的位置上整合了这两种类型的信息。4．对经济环境和可用性的关系型信用的冲击经济环境的冲击，银行与小企业之间的操作可能对银行关系型贷款的承包的层次和倾向产生明显的影响。这些冲击可以引进多种形式的监管体制科技创新，在竞争条件下转变，在宏观经济环境下变化。我们提供的每一种类型的冲击和检查都有相关的研究证据。作为技术创新的一个例子，小型企业贷款证券化可能是最耐人寻味的。它涉及到的采用创新金融技术已经运用于抵押贷款市场和其他小型企业贷款申请的地方。然而，小型企业贷款证券化也有了相当大的问题(Acs,1999)。政府次级市场的小型企业贷款可以通过减少对小公司的资金成本，贷款证券制度化和提高贷款总数。但是，在某些情况下,这种政策将促进贷款关系的证券化的同时也带来了关系利益的损失。 1993年美国监管体制的转变增加了小企业借贷,特别是关系型贷款。主要联邦主管银行开始联合计划旨在缓解行为明显不愿意贷款的金融机构(内部政策声明对信用的可用性，3月10日，1993)。例如,在一些情况下,银行可以根据他们过去的经验发放最小限度的小型商业客户贷款——而不是被考官批评这样做。银行业竞争条件相结合下的许多变化导致了全球银行业的重大整理。而技术变化和其他因素已经在这一整合中扮演了很多角色，可以说是最重要的变化都来自政府的管制。银行整理对小企业借贷的影响通常表现在合并和收购涉及大型银行组织的情况下，能从本质上减少小企业贷款尽管小组织间的整合常常能增加小企业贷款(e.g.,Keeton,1996,PeekandRosengren,1998;StrahanandWeston,1998;Berger,A.etal.,1998;AveryandSamolyk,2000;BonaccorsidiPattiandGobbi,2000)。一项研究发现,没有明确的证据表明小型企业贷款能有更高的几率会被当地银行拒绝。(ColeandWalraven,1998)。其他的研究发现,小型企业从小型银行获得信贷比例大约处于小银行在当地市场的信用度(Berger,A.etal.,2001d)。还发现小企业信用贷款的利率收取倾向于银行在市场上的主导地位。(Berger,A.etal.,2001d)。还有些其他的研究发现银行整合影响小企业如何看待自己的治疗方法。(ScottandDunkelberg,1999)。5结论经济环境的变化为银行和小型企业经营中小公司的信用增加了可用性的关注。本文所关注的部分内容反映出一个事实,小型企业都经常存在信息不透明现象，和大公司相比有较少的外部融资选择。不出所料,实证研究表明,许多小公司很大程度上依赖于银行外部资本。虽然关系型贷款已经得到了较大的研究，但是关系型贷款的过程并不是很清楚。一个清晰的认识,关系型贷款的工作原理和银行组织结构影响着其是否有能力提供这个服务，需要通过评估最近的经济环境变化来确定其如何影响小企业信用。本文分析了关系型贷款的内部工作方式和银行组织结构和经济环境冲击对小企业信贷关系可用性的影响。经济环境的冲击，银行和小企业操作可能对银行关系型贷款的承包的层次和倾向产生明显的影响。在其职权范围内,我们综合分析了许多对小企业关系型贷款的可用性冲击的影响，还检查了相关研究证据。这项发现可能揭示了不少有关政策的问题,包括但不限于:1)是否必须建立小型企业贷款二级市场2）监管制度变化的影响，如银行资本要求的改变或者银行监督标准的增韧——在关系贷款供应方面和3）宏观经济的变化影响，比如货币政策的转变对小企业关系型贷款的影响。